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THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIRGINIA LAW:
1969-1970

PRACTICE AND PLEADING
W. Taylor Reveley Ill*
Mter quicldy: · outlining .recent _legislation in the field of practice and
pleading, this Article proceeds to' a more detailed treatment of pertinent
judicial developments. Several o£ the Supreme Court of Appeals' deciSions
merit close attention, principally,Rak~s v. F7Jlcher1 and Sullivan v. Little
Hunting· Park, lnc.2 Recurrent in the discussion of the judicial opinions
is concern not only with the announced law, but also with the manner Of
the announcement-concern, that is, with both the legal results and the legal
craftsmanship. Organizationally, an attempt has been made to discuss the
judicial material at the time of its "moment of truth" in the procedural
process; for example, the problem of "an issue first raised on appeal" will
be treated under the consideration of trial errors, since the failure to raise
an issue during trial generally precludes success on appeal, so far as that
issue is concerned.
THE WoRK oF THE GENERAL AssEMBLY

Among the more important 1969-1970 legislative developments was enactment of a provision empowering courts of record and courts not of record
to "prescribe such rules as may be reasonably appropriate to promote proper
order and decorum, the convenient and efficient use of courthouses and
clerks' offices and the orderly management of court dockets." 3 This provision is limited in that any rules adopted are to be applicable only to the
courts prescribing them and are not to be "inconsistent with or in addition
to any statutory provision, or the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals,
or contrary to the decided cases." 4 In addition, such rules may not have
"the effect of abridging substantive rights of persons before such court." 6
• Member, Virginia Bar. A.B., 1965, Princeton University; LL.B., 1968, University of
Virginia.
1210 Va. 542,172 S.E.2d 751 (1970). See text at notes 64-101 infra.
2Appeal refused, 208 Va. cxiii (1967), vacated & remanded, 392 U.S. 657, reordered,
209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See text at notes 119-134
infra.
3 VA. ConE ANN. § 8-1.3 (Supp. 1970), repealing id. § 16.1-25 (1957), which stated:
"The judge of a court not of record may make and enforce such reasonable rules of
practice for his court, as are not in conflict with law."
4[d. § 8-1.3 (Supp.1970).
5[d.

j.,

•
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Regarding service of process and notice, the General Assembly eliminated
the requirement that the return on out-of-Virginia personal .service state
that "the defendant so served is a nonresident of this State." 6 The legislators also provided that, when process is served on the Commissioner of the
Division of Motor Vehicles as the agent of a nonresident defendant involved
in a Virginia traffic accident, notice to the defendant may be mailed (a) to
the last address given by him on his license application if he was licensed
by Virginia, assuming no other address is known, or (b) to the address
given on the accident report if he was not so licensed.7 In this regard, the
Virginia licensee is deemed "to have accepted as valid service" the mailing
of process to the address he last reported to the Division. Even more important, the non-Virginia licensee is deemed to have waived his right to
notice and to have accepted service upon the Commissioner if he incorrecdy
reports his address or if he moves from the reported address without pro.viding for the forwarding of his mail.
A judicial power of some importance was made explicit in a Code section
stating that a mental or physical examination of a party may be ordered
if the pleadings raise an issue as to his condition and the opposing party so
moves. This section provides:
·
,,

Any other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, in any
action, if the pleadings raise an issue as to the physical or ,menb,ll condition of a party, the court, upon motion of an adverse party, may
order the party to submit to an examination by one or more physicians
or licensed clinical psychologist [sic] named in the order and employed by the moving party. A written report of the e_xamipation
shall be made by the physician or physic;:ians or licensed. clinical psychologists to the court and filed with the clerk thereof before the
trial and a copy furnished to each party. The court may; in the order,
fix the time an:d place for the examination ·and the. time for· filing the
·
··
·
·
report and furnishing the copies.8
The General Assembly also notably ·heightened the penalties for fillure
to respond to a civil summons._ Prior to its·amendment, Code section 8-302
authorized, among other sanctions, that the miscreant be _fined ~'not exceeding twenty dollars, to the use of the party for·whom he was summoned."
He may now be assessed up to two hundred dollars for that purpose and
6 I d. § 8-74. The amendment goes on to provide retroactively that "[a)ny· defendant
served pursuant to the provisions of this section prior to [January 1, 1970] shall be
deemed to have been a nonresident of this State even though the return fails to state
that the defendant so served was a nonresident of this State."
7 Id. § 8-67.2. See also id. § 8-76 (procedure governing notice by publication in divorce
or annulment proceedings).
.
! ·
·
s I d. § 8-210.1.
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tif ·such assessment, P'iay he punished ~s ·for

a contern_et_:cGmmitt_ed .in the pre_s~nce of the court." 9 ·

• .

.

· .

· · •

· Several· amendments affecting jury: selection were adopted.. Whe:re' pte'viously any Woman could notify the jury cornmissidner that she did not
desire th~t· het ~name be placed on the jury list, she must now have the
occupation- af housewife before obtaining the privilege. In addition, veterinar:J:~ns ru:etnow exempt from jury duty.10 The method of compiling jury
lists has also· been changed "slightly- so that a city's inhabitants are ·now
counted With those of the county in 'vhich the city is located if "the circuit
court of the county also has jurisdiction of cases arising within the teiri.
· . •
toriallimit:S of such city : . . ." 11
The General Assembly also sought to ease somewhat the burden of
counsel at trial by eliminating the necessity that lawyers make fmmal
exception to· those rulings or orders of courts of record· that they oppose:
Forma:l exceptions to rulings or orders of the court shall be unneces'sary; but for all purposes for which an exception has heretofore
been necessary, it shall be sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling
or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the
action which he desires the court to take or his objections to the
action of the cqurt and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no
opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him on motion
for a new trial or on appeal.12

!f nothing else, this provision should reduce the number of appeals lost on
technicaliti~.

Various changes were made in. judicial costs and fees, the principal: legislation centering on briefs before the Supreme Court of Appeals. Prior to
·its amendment, Code section 14.1-182 referred to a single brief and provided that the assessed cost for its printing could not exceed one hundred
tweno/ doll~s~ The section now states that "[a]ny party in whose favor
costs are allowed in the Supreme Court of Appeals shall have taxed as part
of the cost'the actual cost of printing his brief or briefs, if filed by him, not
to exceed t\vo hundred dollar~." 13 In addition, minor changes were made
in several fees incident to suit.14'
--. 9.[d. § S-302.
10 I d. § 8-178.:

ll'Jd. § 8-1S2. Also concerned with juries is id: § 8-792 (1957), which provides that
:r jury may: be empanelled to try a case of unlawful entry or detainer only when the
case is being tried before :i court of record.
· ·
12[d. § 8-225.1.
18Jd. § 14.1-1S2 (Supp.1970).
14Jd. § 14.1-72 (fees of sheriffs, sergeants and deputies for trial attendance); id.
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· Finally an act was passed to prohibit the practice of law in Virginia courts
by certain retired state judges and commissioners. The measure provides
that:
No former justice or judge of a court of record of the Commonwealth and no former full-time judge of a court not of record of the
Commonwealth, who is retired and receiving benefits under [the Judicial Retirement System, created by 1970 legislation, §§ 51-160 to 177],
shall appear as counsel in any case in any court of the Commonwealth.
No former commissioner of the State Corporation Commission or
Industrial Commission, who is retired and receiving benefits under
[the Judicial Retirement System] shall appear as counsel in any case
before the Commission of which he was formerly a member.15
This provision serves not only to remove the possibility of actual prejudice
to parties who might have been opposed by such former judges, but also to
"avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." 1 6
THE WoRK oF THE SuPREME CouRT oF APPEALS

Bars to Trial
Election of Remedies

During the Survey period, parties sought by a variety of gambits to prevent trial. In Jennings v. Realty Developers, Inc.p defendants raised in bar
an alleged election of remedies. Realty had filed a suit in chancery in June
1964 for specific performance against Jennings in a property dispute, but
had taken no further steps to prosecute the action. In February 1967, Realty
filed a motion for damages arising out of the same dispute. One year thereafter it sought and received a nonsuit on the specific performance claim.
Defendants then argued that resort to the specific performance suit constituted an election of remedies and barred the later damage action. The
Supreme Court of Appeals found no bar, holding that
the mere institution of a suit in chancery does not necessarily of itself
constitute an election of remedies and preclude the bringing of an
action at law; that where two proceedings are instituted on the same
state of facts, the defendant can compel the plaintiff to make an elecS 14.1-112 (those of clerks of courts of record); id. § 14.1-125' (those of judges and
-clerks of courts not of record and justices of the peace). See also id. §§ 5'8-71, -72
'(changes in cen:tin writ taxes).
15 Va. Acts of Assembly 1970, cb. 778.
16 ABA CoDE OF PRoFESSIONAL RESPoNsmrurr AND CANONS oF JumciAL

'9 (1969).
17 210 Va. 476,171 S.E.2d 829 (1970).

ETHics,
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cion; and that there can be only one recovery where the c;ause .of
action involves the same parties and touches the same subjec::t matter.._;
In the instant case the trial judge, before permitting Realty ~D~
veloper~ to proceed in its law action, required that it make an election.
. The elec~ion was made and the chancery suit was dismissed,- leaving
only~ne c_ause of action which was prosecuted to a judgment.18 . ·
The 9ourt ~~ted without further explanation that its holding "refle~ts . . .
the be5t co_n,sidered :view." 19
.

·.

Judgments. in:Pr,ior Actions
.
Judgments in prior .actions were raised as bars in two cases. In each the
Court rever?ed_ the trial judge. Doummar v. Doummar20 involved the validity
of a lease 'o~ property owned by an incompetent. The defendants filed a
"Special Plea of Res Adjudicata," contending that the validity ~f _the Jea5e
"was litigated and determined in the first proceeding, or could have been
so litigated and getermined, and that the second proceeding is, therefore~
barred." 21 In the first proceeding the sale of certain property owned by
the incompetent had been sought' and granted on the ground that his existing income was inadequate to support him. The validity of th~ .lease '\Vas
squarely raised in that proceeding, but apparendy the commissioner in
chancery and· trial court made no ruling concerning the lease "other tfian
was riecessa:ry·in finding that th~ income of the incompetent was insufficient
for 'his· support." 22 The. Court of Appeals concluded that "the :caus·es of
action involved in the two proceedings are not the same. The· first was a
statutc>l:~f pro·ceeding· for the sale of certain property of the incompetent:
~e_'second;' to. have declared void a lease of other property 0'\Vn,ed by t~e
at 482, 171 S.E.2d at 834; cf. Sood v. Advanced Computer Techniques. Corp.,
Supp., 239 (E.D. Va. 1969). In Sood, the plaintiff successfully.lt[gue~ that tlw
defendant h:id waived its right of removal to federal court by filing cross-~aims in theVrrginia trial court where it had been sued by plaintiff. The district court stated that
under Virginia law the defendant "was not required to file its counterclaim in the
State. Court, or face the loss of its claim." !d. at 240. Then, as a matter of federal
procedure, the court held that "[s]ince the filing of a counterclaim was not compulsory
but optionai; the defendant invoked the jurisdiction of the State Court, _submitted aU
issues in that case for its determination, and thereby became a plaintiff." !d. at 242.
19 210 Va. at 483, I'll S.E.2d at 834. The Justices did cite passages from three legal encyclopedias to support their conclusion; one passage states: "[l]n Virgini~, it is· held
that in that clas.s of cases in which the remedies are not inconsistent but are alternative
and concurrent, there is no election ••• unless the plaintiff has gained an advllntage, or
the defendant has suffered a disadvantage." 6 MicmE's }UR. Election of Rernedies § 4
(1949).
.
'
.
20 210 Va.-189, 169 S.E.2d 454 (1969).
21 !d. at 190, 169 S.E.2d at 455.
22 !d. at 193, 169 S.E.2d at 457.
lF.Jd!

~08~·F.
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incompetent, is an equitable proceeding sounding in fraud ... ·": 23 It follows that plaintiff did not have a claim of res .judicata, but, at most~ a .claim
of collateral estoppel; and, as the Court stated, where a different ca:use ·of
action is raised in the second proceeding, the prior judgment bars further
litigation " 'only as to those matters in issue or points controverted- [in the
prior proceeding], upon the determination of which the finding or verdict
was rendered.' " 24 The Court continued:
It is obvious from the record of the first suit that the court .
left to another day and another proceeding the determination of .the
issue of the validity of the lease. The court merely overruled ... exceptions [to the commissioner's report based on his failure to declare
the lease a nullity] and confirmed the commissioner's report without
making any ruling concerning the lease other than was necessaiy in
finding that the income of the incompetent was insufficient for his
support.25
In contrast to Doummar, where the Justices found no estoppel despite
the presentation of the pertinent issue in a prior proceeding, they did find
estoppel in Thrasher v. Thrasher,26 where the pertinent issue had not been
raised. In 1961 a decree was entered in Thrasher approving settlement agreements resolving a dispute over corporate control. These agreements were
premised on the existence of a voting trust, but the validity of that trust was
not raised or passed on in the 1961 action. The Court nonetheless held th~t
the decree barred a subsequent suit to have the voting agreement voided as
invalid. The seeming inconsistency between Doummar and Thrasher is explained by the Court's concern in the latter more with a belief that the party
challenging the voting trust was attempting " 'to play fast and loose with
courts' " than with the rules of estoppel.27 The Justices stated that the
evidence "clearly shows that [the party], in signing the settlement agreements approved by the decree of .•. 1961, held himself out to be acting
under a valid voting trust. . . • Having signed the 1961 settlement agreements based upon a valid voting trust, and having had his attorney ask the
court to enter the decree approving these agreements, [that party] will
not now be permitted to reverse his position by denying the validity of
23Jd. at 192, 169 S.E.2d at 456.
24Jd. at 191, 169 S.E.2d at 456; see Boyd, Practice and Pleading, 1966-1967 Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 1779, 1796-97 (1967).
25 210 Va. at 193, 169 S.E.2d at 457.
26 210 Va. 624, 172 S.E.2d 771 (1970).
_ 27Jd. at 628, 172 S.E.2d at 774, quoting Rohanna v. Vazzana, 196 Va. 549, 553, 84
'S.E.2d 440, 441 (1954): "'A rule denying litigants the right to play fast and loose
with courts should be maintained. • • • The rule as here employed may not be strictly
.regarded as one of estoppel but rather in the nature of a poSitive rule of procedure ••• .' "
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the voting trust agreement." 28 The Court also noted that " [w] e have had
recent occasion to reaffirm the principle that a party cannot assume positionS.
which are inconsistent with each other and mutually contradictory." 29 •
In an analogous decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
DistriCt of Columbia Circuit held in a master-servant case that' a· plaintiff's
defeat in a Virginia action against an employer for the alleged negligenc~
of his employee precluded the plaintiff's subsequent suit in a District of
Columbia court against the servant. The second action was based on the
same claim of negligence and for the same injuries,30 and the servant had
not been a party to the prior Virginia action. Commenting on Virginia law,
the federal court noted the Commonwealth's "consistent allegiance i:o the
principle that res judicata bears only on parties to the judgment ...." 31 Yet,
the court continued:
We discern in the Virginia cases, not a devotion to the principle of
mutuality as an unbending dogma, but a recognition that the appropriateness of its application hangs on the relative strength of the policy
considerations in competition.
'
Much more important-and in our view decisive-are the_ Virginia
decisions disseminating the policy that one adverse litigative adventure
•
on any one issue is enough for any one litigant.32
Thus, the court felt that the prior judgment for the master would 'preclude
relitigation of the negligence issue in an action against the seryant in :).
Vrrginia court.aa

Prior Settlements
In two cases, prior settlements were presented as barriers to trial. Tl;e
Virginia Court of Appeals in Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. 34 found the settlement _conclusive. The parties .had settled uninsured motorist claims, and judgments by agreement had been entered and
satisfied. Eighteen months later the plaintiffs sought to have .these judg:
ments set aside, primarily because an intervening ruling by the Court had
made relief available from additional insurance carriers. The' Court found
.
28 210 Va. at
29 Id. at 628,

627, 628, 172 S.E.2d at 773, 774.
172 S.E.2d at 773, citing McLaughlin v. Gholson, 210 Va. 498, 171 S.E.2d
816 (1970), discussed in text at notes 56-58 infra.
·· ·
30Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.1969).
31 I d. at 718.
32 !d. at 719.
33 Though there appears to be no Virginia precedent squarely on point, the· court
of appeals seems correct. Cf. Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 S:E.2d 751. 757
(1970).
·34 210Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264 (1969).

1970].'
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that no more than a possible mistake of law was at stake, and thus that "the
extraordinary circumstances which would entitle the appellants to relief"
were lacking.35
The Court made clear in Nationwide Mutua/Insurance Co. v. Martin/a
however, that a settlement cannot be used to prevent a party from introducing evidence in court in an attempt to vitiate the agreement. The
Nationwide parties were engaged in a lawsuit when they agreed to compromise their dispute. The day after the agreement was reached, and before
their suit had been dismissed, Nationwide obtained evidence that allegedly
indicated that it had been the victim of fraud. The trial court confirmed
the settlement nonetheless, without giving Nationwide an opportunity to
present its evidence. The Court, observing that " 'Nationwide seeks only
the opportunity to be heard,' " 37 ordered that the opportunity be granted.
The case of after-discovered evidence was distinguished: Where there has
"never been a trial, the introduction of any evidence, or the return of a
verdict," a party seeking to rescind a settlement need not set forth in affidavits facts showing what efforts he made to obtain the facts prior to settlement and why he failed to get them. 38 The Court premised Nationwide's
opportunity to be heard on the "well established" principle that" '[a]djustments or settlements may be rescinded or avoided for fraud.' " 39

Failure to Prosecute
A seldom raised plea-in-bar was presented the Court by the defendants'
argument)n Jennings v. Realty Developers, lnc. 40 that Realty had lost its
cause of action by failing to prosecute its specific performance suit promptly
after the suit's commencement. As indicated previously, there was a delay
of more than three and one-half years between the initiation of the specific
performance proceeding and, on the same day, its dismissal and the trial
35 I d. at 402, 171 S.E.2d at 268. The Court stated that "every fact necessary to be
known to form a correct conclusion as to the question of law to be decided was known
to both the appellants and to the representatives of the insurance companies." Jd. at 400,
171 S.E.fd at 26~. These facts were also known to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, and it reached an incorrect conclusion as to the pertinent question of law. The Piedmont parties relied heavily on that federal conclusion in determining
their own: conduct. See text at note 141 infra.
36 210 Va. 354, 171 S.E.2d 239 (1969).
37 I d. at 359, 171 S.E.2d at 242.
as I d. at 358, 171 S.E.2d at 242. The Court dealt recently with the question of_ afterdiscovered evidence in Fulcher v. Whitlow, 208 Va. 34, 155 S.E.2d 362 (1967), discussed
in Boyd, supra note 24, at 1803-05. The trial court in the present case stressed NationWide's failure to take advantage of its opportunity to obtain the evidence of fraud
before agreeing to the settlemertt. See 210 Va. at 356-57, 171 S.E.2d at 240-41.
3{) ]d.· at 357, 171 S.E.2d at 242,
·
40 210 Va. 476, 171 S.E.2d 829 (1970).
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ofRealty's.damage_action, premised on the facts that had been the basis·for
t:h_e· ~hancery claiin:· "Here nothing was done· in the .chancery suit until the
day for trial of appellee's law action, at which time a nonsuit w:as taken." 41
Ne~ther R~lty nor ~h~ defendg~ts moved during the -interim -t~ speed ,_the
licigatiop.: The Court s~ated simply:
..

.. while the;e was a duty on the part of appell~e to mirumize damages, ... it did not lose its cause. of action by the delay. Appellants
· were put on .notice llrimediately they breached their contract that
appellee would hold them answerable. Had they d!'!Sired ~ JTIOre expeditious resolution of the controversy, it was within their power,
· as well as th3;t of appellee, to enlist the aid of the co~ in speeding
·
·
·
the cause.42
The Col:r.rt seems to have reached its result ·without an adequate consideratio~ ?f the issues involved, or at 'least without an airillg of> them in its
opinion. First, the decision: implies that there is an equal obligation on both
defendant and pl~ntiff to prosecute, an action in which they are. involved.
The equality of their obligatio~, however,_ is open ~o serious· ques~on. One
judge has said, for e~mpie, that "I see no reaso~ why the p~rty who •vas
sued and has no counterclaiin against the phiintiff should take any steps: to
subject himself to the expense and inconvenience of a trial if the plainti_ff)
neglect is such as to give the defendant the hope or expetfation that the
case will. never be tried." 4.a And. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4I.(b)
provideS: that "[f] or failure. of the plaintiff to prosecute .... .a defendant
may move for dismissal of an -action or of any claim against him." It. see'ms
f.air that. the. party who initiates a legal proceeding and . ~eeks to benefit
from it should bear the greater burden of prosecuting -tt, ·at. the peril of
dismissal for delay. The Virginia Court provides no explanation of its
apparent."'cie:w_thatiaimess does not compel .a greater burden of prosecution.on the plaintiff than the· defendant.
·
··
: ·Perhaps the- CoUrt: meant: less to suggest that. the burdens ·are equivalent
than that ~~e defe~dants here _h,ad failed to raise timely obj~ction to. pl:$1.:
tiff's delay. Many _courts in. the analogous .criminal sphere have );leld. · th~t
~he-sixth amendment right to a speedy trial comes into play only after the
accused has complained of delay. 44 Thus, the present d~cision possibly means
only that delay by a plaintiff in a civil action is ~·be ~e~~ed .from the
4iJi_lit 482, 1~1 S.E.2d

it 834.

• 42 Iii. at 48.3, 171.S.E.2d at ins:

~.

·

f;_4~.Tip.;erman·Prods., Int:. v. George K. Garrett Co., 22 F."R.D,

.•

S6, 57 .(E.D. Pa. 1958.):
«E.g., United States v. Lustirian;. 258 F.2d 475; 478 '(2d Cix:),-¥:'ert.·denied, 358-.U.S'
880 (1958). See generally Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L: REv.
1587, 1601-09 (1965).
• . ~.
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time of the defendant's objection to it-apparendy a period of n:o .significance in this case.
.· ~e~o~d, the Court made no mention of th~ problem of prejudice. A passage of ;three and one-half years takes its toll on the memories of parties \lnd
witnesses, and, at times, on their availa~ility. Similarly, documentary· evid.~nce m~y be damaged or lost during the course of a lengthy delay. Thus,
ariy significant delay makes reliable fact-finding more difficult, and, in some
c~es, impossible. Would the· Virginia Court, for example, permit a· plaintiff to .prbs~cute an action largely dependent on testimonial eviden<:e after
·~ .~elay of ten years, eveh if the defendant failed to object to the delay
prior'fo th~ ·time of trial? .Presumably,.though it made no mention of the
fact, the'Cotirt did not. feel that a delay of over three and one-half years
made .ul:llikely·accurate fact-fip.ding in Jennings; or, perhaps the defendants
'were. un~ble to show that they were prejudiceq by tl.te delay.
.. TQird,.the Court did not discuss the public interest that t]lere be no undue
·delay~ ·in t4e ·disposition of pending cases so that congesti~n in Virgirua
trial courts can be avoided. Judges generally have inheren,t power to dismiss
'for faill.ire ·of prosecution by the plaintiff, even without a motion from the
defendant.45 Presumably, then, the Justices did not think that Realty had
abused Virginia's judicial process, possibly because it had presented some
justification for its delay. 46 Finally, the Court did not deal with the consideration that very probably underlay its decision-the desirability that,
except i~ extreme circumstances, disputes be resolved on their medt5.47
The,~'opportunity to be heard" is a cornerstone of due· process, not easily
overturned. .
.
.
.
.~
. ' .
On .baJance, sin,ce. the· defendap.ts apparently failed to object· to· Re~lty's
delay ~urlrig_.its progress, since they seemed unable to present evidence th~t
· the ·delay prejudiced their defense, and sfnce it does not appear that Realty~s
dilatory:.conduct placed inordinate burdens on the trial court's time,. the
Gourt:·~ fesolution of the prosecution issue was proper.. ~here. were . n_o
circumstances sufficient to overcome the. presumption in favor·· of. a. trial
1
on the merits. A delay of three and on~-half years, ~owever; was sufficiendy
long:>t_o_call for more than a.terserejection by the appellatel.cour~··of .the
p'r6secution claim.
·
·
.: .': · . · - ,. .· ·..
r

. \4riE.g.,

(1957).

~4Uc v. Wabash R.R., 370
.

u.s. 626, 629-,30
'

(1962h
. .

••

se~ vA..Co.oE ANN.·§ 8-154
--,

.•

..

\ '

Theie was ; clme lag benveen the filing ofthe'bill for spec1fi~ perforroailce and
its dismissal, and the trial of the law action. 'Appellee's explanation is'that J'portion
of the time it was endeavoring to pursuade appellants to fulfill th~ir contract, 'and
'thereafter it.was trying to.effect·a sale of the property.,
_, .• :-- ,:1.
•210Va.at4~3,171SE.2dat834-35. ·.
.
.
..
; t·47.''Ult should. be kept in mind that dismissal .with: pJ~judice ~a· drastic .sa,nction to
be applied only in extreme situations." 2B W. BARRON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE§ 917, at 136-37 (Wright ed. 1961) .. r,:c:
·,;.; ..;-,.46
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Jurisdictio·n
One final case dealing with a plea-in-bar is appropriately mentioned
here for its ruling that even the most fundamental challenges to the propriety of trial need not be resolved before the merits are reached. In Tidewater Construction Corp. v. Duke,48 a Jones Act case, the defendants argued
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter "because the
barge on which the plaintiff was working when he was hurt was out of
service; [the] plaintiff was not a member of the crew; . . . he was not entided to any warranty of seaworthiness, and . . . his exclusive remedy was
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act .•.." 49
The defendants unsuccessfully insisted that the court rule on the jurisdictional challenge before submitting the case to the jury on the merits. The
judge, concluding that "substantially all of the evidence" needed to resolve
the jurisdictional issues also bore on the merits, ruled that the plea-in-bar
and the merits should be determined together, thus avoiding the burden of
two trials. The Court of Appeals upheld his ruling, stating: "The several
hundred pages of testimony taken on these questions and the outcome of
the case demonstrate the propriety of this holding ...." so

Pretrial Steps
Process
In two unexceptional federal diversity actions, defendants asked the court
to quash process served on them under Virginia long-arm statutes. There
was a bit of whimsy in the choice of Virginia as a forum in Skarpelis v.
M/T Arthur P.,u an action for $130 said to have been lawlessly deducted
from the plaintiff's seaman's pay in Boston on December 31, 1967. Plaintiff,
a Greek national who had never been a resident of Vrrginia, argued that
a portion of that sum-approximately $2.64-could be attributed to the time
he was·aboar.d the defendant vessel during a six-hour visit to Newport News
on December 6, 1967, and thus that a portion of his claim arose in Virginia.
The court,. however, found that defendants were not doing business in
Virginia and, accordingly, that no portion of plaintiff's claim arose in Virginia for process purposes.
Luther Compton & Sons, Inc. v. Community National Life Insurance

· In

· ~s'iw
,. Va.143, 169 S.E.2d 585

(1969).
49ld. at 147, 169 S.E.2d at 588..
50 I d. The Court also distinguished its earlier decision in Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309,
130 S.E.2d 582 (1963), on these grounds. In Lucas the Court held that the jurisdictional
issue should have been disposed of before the trial court proceeded to hear the case on
·
its merits.
51 302 F. Supp.147 (E.D. Va. 1969).
'
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Co.,62 however, a federal court in Oklahoma ordered full faith and credit
given to a final Virginia judgment, after rejecting the arguments of defendant insurance company, an Oklahoma corporation not licensed in Virginia, that the Commonwealth's process statutes are constitutionally deficient and, if not so deficient, that defendant had not had the requisite
contacts with Virginia. The court held the pertinent statutes constitutional
under McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,63 and found that the company had engaged in four "substantial acts" in i:he Conimonwealth via its
broker-agent: It had arranged for the medical examination of the insured,
delivered his policy to him, collected the initial premium, and later sought
to return the premium and recover the policy, all in Virginia.
Pleading
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court of Appeals emphasized the
unsteady ground upon which trial courts and parties tread when they deal
with issues beyond or inconsistent with those framed by the pleadings.
In Buchner v. Kenyon L. Edwards Co.,54 the plaintiff's pleadings sought a
declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenant on certain property was
void as against public policy. The trial court held the restriction valid, but
nonetheless went on to find that it would be unreasonable for the defendants
to prevent the contemplated use of the property. The Court reversed, stating that "[i]n holding that the restrictive covenant was not invalid the lower
court ruled on the sole issue raised by the pleadings.... [T]he court erred
in going further to pass upon the reasonableness of application of the restrictive covenant, an issue beyond the pleadings." 56
In McLaughlin v. Gholson,66 the parties stipulated that "'the sole issue
for the Court is its construction of the contract to determine whether under
its tenns ... the obligation . . . had become void for absence of any signature of an authorized [Farmers Home Administration] official ... , the
'defendant agreeing that he has no defense by which to avoid the relief
prayed for in the Bill of Complaint if such was not the case.' " 51 Although
the lower court found that no signature was required, it then went on to
hold that informal FHA approval was required, and that the plaintiff had
failed to show it. The Court of Appeals reversed, .stating:

When the court found that no signature by FHA was required by
the option agreement this was determinative of all matters in controversy .•..
307 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Okla.1969).
220 (1957).
54 210 Va. 502, 171 S.E.2d 676 (1970).
55[d. at 505, 171 S.E.2d at 678.
56 210 Va. 498, 171 S.E.2d '816 (1970).
57[d. at 500, 171 S.E.2d at-817.
52

58 355
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By -agreeing that he had ·no .defense to the bill of complaint if the
agreement was not void for lack of signature thereto by FHA,
Gholson. effectively e~ated any other possible_defenses which nligli.t
. have ·been available to him. He cannot take the·inconsistent position
th~t .. if the agreement was valid because no FHA signature was ~e
. ·quired il: was nevertheless invalid because informal FHA approval
was _requir;d and ~ot proved. A litigant canno1:.assume l?ositions which
.
. :: ;rre mconststent w1th ·~ach other and mutually contradictory.58
0

•

•

·:

•

~option

•·. TI{ a; s~* vein is Kleirf' v~ National Toddle Rouse Corp., where the
Court· neh:l' that. \vhen "grounds for a demurrer are voluntarily stated
therein then only the grounds so stated will be. considered." 59 . The defendants demurred in writing on the ground that allegations in the plaintitfs'~ pl~eacp~g. 'Y~~C: ,factually i:p.consis~ent. Subsequendy,. the defendants
argued that ·there was.also a misjoinder by plaintiffs of actions ex contractu
'and .ex gelicto. Th~ C'ou~t held: "Since no inconsistency appears fr9m the
ple~ding,' it f~llo~s;that the trial court was in error msustaining. the demurrer ori':th.e7 only: written ground assigned [that the allegations -were ~actually
iricoiisisi:ent]:•• 60 ·
·
·
·
.'f~~·.pi~i~ti~~. Pied??!ont Trost. Btz?Zk v. Aetna Casualty i9- Surety Co. 61
allege.~ c~~t:rnc~ve fra.ud a~ one of their grounds for relief. 'J;'he Cot;~rt used
.t~~ir. ow;t: plf?adings to defe'a! .theJ?J: "It is regarded as fundamental that
fraJi1 1c~p,~6~ ~erpredicateo upo~ what amo~n~ to a m~re eh.'Pression of an
~pf~??··;): :.~er~,.~d~{'the facts._s~t forth m the pleadings! w~ .are clea:ly
dealing with an expr~~Pl'} of oprmon by the repres~ntatives of the ms~ance c~mpanies:" 6 ~ "Fron:( appellants' plea~~gs, it affi.rmatively.appears
tha~ appell;u~ts did nqt .rely on the opinions expresse~ by .the repres~~tatives
of. the i~anc~. ~o~paQies but. ~onducted thei! o~v.n if}dependent )itvestigatiori by ~eeking and obtaining the opinion ~f an outside expert. Hence the
.element, of 'reliance, an essential element of fraud, was .absent 'and, in those
circufi)~i:,k~~~,, t4e-!'e cp~~ be no fraud. Thus the bill was properlY, subject
to demurrer." 63
·

m:

'

.

'

•:

· ·6$ ia.~a.t sO:r; 11f s.E.2d at 818. : ·.. · ·. · ··

· ·· ·
Va. 641, 643, 172 S.E.29 782.; 783 (1970).
60 Id. at 644, 172 S.E.2d at 7S4; cf. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 210 Va. 354,
357,'17l:.S:.E.~d 239, 241" (1~49); wh~re th~ Court stllte9~ ·"There is no evidence in the
recoJd: upon:which 'the ·cou.~:"£01l}:d ·,i}ave:m~de any finding of fact. All that the court
had before it were Symple's motion for judgment; Nationwide's grounds ol defense;
ancL Martin's. motion.for .an .order-confirming-the. compromise."
61210 Va. 396, 171 S.E.2d 264 (1969).
-· -'
62Jd. at 399,171 S.E.2d at267.
63 !d. at 400, 171 S.E.2d at 267. Similarly, in Cales vYChesapeake & 0. Ry., 300 F. Supp.
155, 157-58 (W.D. Va. 1969), the court dismissed the proceeding because the plaintiff's
"allegations pertaining to the wrongful discharge are insufficient [under Virgiilia· l:iwl
to state a cause of action upon which relief may be grintetl : ~ • ."
; • · ·.
59 210
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Discovery: Rakes v. Fulcher

In McLaughlin v. Gholson the Justic;es broadly declare·d: "This court
looks with favor upon the use of stipulations, admissions, discovery and
other pre-trial techniques which are designed to narrow the issues and expedite the trial or settlement of litigation." (l4 In a major case of·fust impression, Rakes v. Fulcher, 65 the Court had an opportunity to give substance to
its declaration with regard to the production of documents and other tangible things.
Plaintiff Rakes sued Fulcher and his employer for bodily injuries that she
allegedly sustained as a result of the negligent operation of a tractor-trailer
owned by the employer and operated by Fulcher in the course of his emploY:merit. Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion ·pursuant to Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals Rule 4:9 asking the court to require the defendants "to
produce· all written statements of witnesses interviewed and. all narratives
and written reports of claims adjusters relative to their investigative activities and contacts with possible witnesses relating to the accident." 66 Rakes'
supporting affidavit stated that she believed that " 'immediately upon the
occurrence of the accident or soon thereafter,' the defendants, through their
agents or agents of their insurance carrier, conducted an invest;igation of
the facts and circumstances leading up to the accident; that the information
requested was necessary and important to prove the negligence of Fulcher
and it was not readily available to plaintiff." 67 · In a lat~r affidayit, Rakes
stated that the documents were needed to resolve a suspected inconsistency
or incompleteness in the statement of a certain witness. On the sail)e day
that plaintiff filed her Rule 4:9 motion, ·she also filed interrogatpries-:asking
for the names and addresses of all persons known to defendants who, knew
of the facts of the accident. The trial judge denied· the motion for discovery
of the documents on the ground that plaintiff had failed to show "good
cause" for their production. The judge did, however, approve the requested
interrogatories.
Rule 4:9 provides in pertinent part: ....
Upon motion of any party showing good. ·cause. therefor and upon
. notice to all other parties, ... the. court in which an action i,s pending
may (I) order any party to produce and permit 1:he inspe~tion and
copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the ·moving party, of
any designated documents, paper's, books,. ·accoqnts, · letters, photo64210 Va. 498,500,171 S.E.2d 816,817 (1970}. See'also City of Portsmouth v.
Cilumbrello, 204 Va. 11, 129 S.E.2d 31 (1963}; Craig, New Virginia Rules for Deposition
·
and Discovery, 53 VA. L. REv. 1818, 1821 (1967};
65.210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970}.
66]d. at 544, 172 S.E.2d at 754.
67]d.
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graphs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, ·which constitUte
. or contain evidence .relating to. any of the matte,rs within the scope
of. the examination permitted by Rule 4: 1 (b) and which are in his
. possessio~, custody, or control ....
. Thus Rakes_ concerns the circumstances in which a litigant can compel
the production of documents or other tangible items. Before dealing with
the specific issue presented by the case's facts, it will be helpful to outline
the general problem of the production of tangible things. 68 At the outset
it 'is well to niake clear that two grounds for the denial of discovery-that
the material sought is privileged or irrelevant to the subject matter of the
action-~re not at issue here. It may be assumed that the tangible things
in question are unprivileged and relevant to the action. If proper, denial of
discovery must rest on another ground.
There are different types of tangible' things. For our purposes, two broad
categories ;may be identified: those documents or things prepared for litigati~n and those not ·so prepared. The latter may have arisen in the ordinary
cohrse of b~ess, to satisfy public requirements not related to the litigati.on
in question, ·or for some other reason unrelated to it. 69 Confusion has been
created by the failure of the pertinent discovery rules to distinguish clearly
between the two categories of tangible things. Both Virginia Rule 4:9 and
its model, old Federal Rule 34,70 can be read to require that "good cause"
be· shown before any tangible thing-whether prepared for litigation or not
-will be ordered produced. Confusion from this source has been heightened
by the existence of two distinct ways of verbalizing the qualified immunity
from discovery enjoyed by tangible things: on the one hand, the simple
"good catise1' language of the rules and on the other, the "necessity or
justification"· language of Hiclmzan v. Taylor,71 the seminal decision in the
area. Courts have been 'uncertain how these two verbalizations relate to one
another-wHether the· qualified immunity granted by the rules' "good cause"
68 See generally 2A W. BARRoN & A. HoLTZOFF, supra note 47, §§ 652-52.2, 652.4;
JunxCIAL CoNFERENCE oF THE UNITED STATES, CoMMITIEE ON RULES oF PRACTICE AND
PRoCEDVRE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRoPOSED .AMENDMENTS TO RULEs OF CML PROCEDURE
FoR~ UNI®' SrA'Iis'Dxsnucr CoURTs RELATING ro DEPosmoN AND.Discom.Y 17-27,
69-70 (No-vi. 1967);· C. WRmin, FEDERAL CouRTS 360-69, 386-89 (2d ed. 1970). Craig,
supra nbte 64, at i835:39. .
·
.
.
.
.
·
69.E.g., ·ooosritan v. A. Duie pYle, Inc., 320·F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963).
70 'fh;e .Coutt bf ·Appeals noted in Rakes that while ''Ru1e 4:9 was adopted by this.
court on November 29, 1966, to become effective February 1, 1967, and there are no
Virginia cases!futerpreting it," 210 Va_ at 545, 172 S.E.2d at 754, it is "substantially the
satite ·as RUJ.e-134 ·of: the 'Federal Ru1es of Civil Procedure : • • and both counsel urge
us to consider the federal cases interpreting. the rule." Jd., 172 S.E.2d at 755. This the
Court did. After Rakes was handed down, the pe¢neQ.t federal rules. were ·amended.
See text at notes 91-93 infra.
..
'll 329
495, 510 (1947).
·. '-:
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is lesser than that granted by Hickman. Nor have courts been certain whether tu 'grant the same immunity to all documents and things, whatever their
type.
A brief look at Hickman will be helpful. After the tug John M. Taylor
simk drowning several crewmen, its owners hired a lawyer to defend them
against any litigation from the sinking. Less than two months later the
survivors· testified at a public hearing; their testimony was available to the
plaintiff. The owners' lawyer then interviewed the witnesses privately and
obtained-from them signed statements regarding the sinking. He interviewed
other persons whom he believed to have pertinent information and made
memoranda of what they said. Seven months after the accident, the administrator of one of the victims sued. Among the interrogatories that he
presented to the defendants was one demanding that they" '[s]tate whether
any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and
'Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug 'John M. Taylor.' Attach
hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in
detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports.' " 72 The
defendants refused to cooperate and the Supreme Court upheld their refusal.
The Supreme Court in Hickman· indic~ted clearly the type of tangible
things with which it was dealing, stating the issue to be "the extent to which
a party may inquire into oral and written statements of witnesses, or oth~r
information, secured by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation after a claim has arisen." 73 The Court made
equally clear that its primary concern was to protect the proper functioning of the adversary system by preventing interference with the thought
processes and work of attorneys: ''Not even the most liberal of discovery
theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney." 74 On this basis the Court distinguished between
written and oral statements given a lawyer, since the production of the
72Jd. at 498-99.
73Jd. at 497 (emphasis added).
74Jd. at 510. The Court explained:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [his attorney] assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare
his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.•.• This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs and countless other
tangible and intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court
·of Appeals in this case as the "work product of the lawyer." Were such materials
open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in
writing would remain unwritten. Any attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate,
would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably
develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial.
Id. at 511.
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latter necessarily "forces the attorn_ey to testify as t<:>; what- P€1 rem<::mber~
or what he saw ~t tq write down regarding witnesses' remarks." 7 5 ,:"t~u.!?,
"as to oral statements made by witnesses [to the lawyer], whether pr~j
endy in the form of his mental impressions or memoranda, we: 'do. riot believe
that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of;'this
case so as to justify production.?' 76 Written statements or· doc~ents, on
the other hand, generally show less of the attorney's thought processes.
These, the Court held, are subject to only a qualified immunity; which
be overcome by a showing of "necessity or justification;" that is, by a showing that the '~denial of such production would unduly p~ejudice the prep-'
aration of petitioner's case oi cause him ... hardship or injustice." 77 Again,
" [w] here relevant and non.:privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's
file and where production of those facts is essential to the preparation of
one's case, discovery may properly be had." 78
Among the occasions mentioned by the Court when "producti6n might
be justified" is "where the witneSses are no longer availab~e or can be
reached only .with difficulty." 70 The Court felt no necessity was shown
in Hickman bec~usethere the pla~tiff sought the statemen~ of "wi~esses
whose identity is well known and whose availability to petitioner appears
unimpaired," so and: because the "petitioner was free to exa~e the pub4~
testimony of the witnesses'; 81 at the public hearing held two months 'aft~
the sinking-:-a--time when presUll1al;>ly the details of the event would still
have been fresh in·- the minds of the witnesses. Moreover,. as the. Court
stressed, the plaintiff · by his interrogatories had already forced the·· defendants to turn over all of the facts about the sinking that they··pos.:.
sessed.s2 It appears that the Court felt that the plaintiff suffered no significant prejudice from the denial of production. The Court .iriight ·well
have found prejudice, however, had the plaintiff shown that even thougl:\.
the witnesses remained available he could not obtain statements from theni
substantially equivalent to those obtairied by the defendants-:-because, for

can

75/d. at 513. It also "gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrust:WOJ;t)liness.". !d.
76Jd. at 512.
77 !d. at 509.
78/d. at 511.
79/d. Or whim "[s]uch ~ritten St::\tements·and documents might •.• be admissible in
evidence or give clues as to the -existence or location of relevant facts. Or ••• be useful
for purposes of impeacftment or· corroboration." !d•
. so !d. at 508.
·
..
81/d. at 509.'
• l
S2'Jd. at 507, 5i3.
: ' : !j~ .\. t
•

I

>

~
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·example, the witnesses .were hostile, or their memories had dimmed or
Iaps~d,since they gave the written statements.83
-Although no. Supreme. Court decisions have spoken to what immunity,
if any, shoula be given to those documents and things not obtained or prepared for litigation, lower federal courts have . generally given them less
pro.tection than that afforded materials prep:tred for litigation: "With respect to documents not obtail;ted or prep~ed with an eye to litigation, the
decisions; while not uniform, .reflect a- strong and incr~?Siq.g tendency to
relate 'good cause' to a showing that the documents are relevant to the
subject matter of the action." 84 This practice is certainly in accord :with
the Supreme Conrt's declaration in Hickman that "deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment." 85
{Jnl~s prepared for litigation, tangible things do not possess special char.acterist,ics sufficient to justify treating them differently than other non-work
product subjects of discovery. Like the latter, they do not d!.rectly reflect
an attorney's thoughts, and they may provide information essential to the
effective functioning of the adversary .. system. Thus, tangible things not
prepared for litigation are appropriately discovered if relevant to the subject matter of the action and non-priviliged. In this regard, ii: is significant
that -the "good cause requirement was originally inserted in [old Federal]
experience with
Rule 34 as a general protective provision in the absence
the ~pecific .problems that would arise thereunder." 86 Thus, ·the requirement did not spring from a considered judgment that all tangible things
need special protection. Subsequent empirical study has shown that, except
w4er~: preparation for litigation is involved, the "good' cause~' requirement
has 'Rf9V.ed unnecessary. 87 Little evidence has been found of attempts by
,.attorneys tO use discovery to unfairly coerce opponents.88 And " [ t Jhe data

of

sa See the' cas~· cited in PREUMINARY DRAFT oF PRoPoSED AMENDMENTs TO Rirr.Es oF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 68, at 25.
84Jd. at 22. Regarding the standard for determining relevance, Professor \Vright has
stated that ~'it is not too strong to say that discovery should be considered relevant
w,her~ there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the
subj~cJ; 'matter of the action"-the fact that the evidence sought would be inadmissible
not bJirig a ground for objection if the ev1dence seems reasonably ·cillculated to lead
'to ~e 'discovery of admissible evidence. C. WRIGHT, ·supra note 68, at 359.
-'S51J~9 U.S: at 507.
.
.
·
·
,
· .
' ~6'PRELIMINARY DRAF-r 'OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF' ,CIVIL PROCEDURE,
.w.Praltlpte 68, "llf69.
.
:87 .A:Atpdy of ~he operation of the discovery rules was made for ~he- Judicial Con. ference's. 9ommi~ee on Rules of Practice, and Pr9cedure by the Project for Effective
Justice; _at Columbia University. The study is described and its findihgs pr~ented in
GLA'SEI{. PiurrRIAL DzscovERY AND: THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968) .' · For a discussion
of its scope and methodology, see id. at 38-50. Among the areas 'Surv~yed Wi!S~the
Western District of Virginia.
·
ss See id. at 117-23, 129-34.
.·:: ·
'; '. :'·
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suggest that the requirement to show 'good cause' has little effect on the
use of inspections," 89 since "most inspections .... occur by notice, regardless of the language of Rule 34. Most lawyers cooperate with their .adversaries, avoid the time-consuming preparation of papers and visits to court,
·
and inspect and submit to inspections by informal agreement." 90
It is true that the absence of a good cause requirement for the discovery
of tangible things could give the lazy attorney undeserved assistance. Such
lawyers would be tempted to make minimal trial preparation and rely instead on discovery to provide them with the requisite information. This
fact of life, however, is inherent in discovery as a whole; it is an unfortunate
but tolerable by-product of ensuring that legal opponents have sufficient
knowledge of the facts to make the adversary system work.
It is important to remember, also, that Virginia courts have broad powers
under Rule 4: 5(b) to respond to a party's need for privacy or secrecy and
to prevent the imposition on him of undue burdens. Thus, a good cause
rule is not necessary to protect those non-work product, tangible things
genuinely in need of immunity from discovery, since immunity for those
things can be obtained through a protective order. Reliance on such
orders has the merit not only of avoiding the needless protection of some
things but also of making clear the process in which the court should be
involved-one of identifying and weighing competing interests and of denying discovery only when the "cause" for production advanced by the
would-be discoverer is less "good" than that advanced by his adversary for
protection.
Effective July 1970, the United States Supreme Court revised the pertinent federal rules to take current practice into account and to end the
"good cause" ambiguity. Regarding tangible things prepared for litigation
(work product), the Court added a new section to Rule 26(b)(3) which
provides in pertinent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things ...
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theo89Jd. at 221.
90 Id.

at 220.
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ries of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
.
litigation.9 1
Thus, the Court has explicitly written Hickman into the rules. As that
opinion suggested, the lawyer's mental processes are to be protected as
much as possible. Work product is to be ordered produced only after a
showing by the would-be discoverer of substantial need and an inability
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material
held by his adversary. Good cause, so far as it relates to work product,
is thus defined by the rigorous Hickman standard. New Rule 26(b)(3)
also resolves an issue left open in Hickman: whether the immunity extends
only to the work product of an attorney or whether it also covers materials
gathered by others, presumably for trial counsel's use and often under his
guidance.92 It covers both.
·
Regarding tangible things not prepared for litigation, the Supreme Court
has struck any requirement of good cause from new Rule 34. Further, such
items may be inspected without court order. Rule 34 as revised provides
that "[a]ny party may serve on any other party a request ... to produce
and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf,
to inspect and copy, any designated documents ... or to inspect and copy,
test, or sample any tangible things ... which are in the possession, custody
or control of the party upon whom the request is served . . . ." 93 Thus, a
showing that non-work product things are not privileged and that they are
relevant to the subject matter of the action will justify production.
Against this background, the Virginia Court's opinion in Rakes is somewhat veiled in its reading of Rule 4:9. The Court opened its analysis of the
Rule with a broad statement:
One purpose of discovery procedures is to obtain evidence in the
sole possession of one party and unobtainable by opposing counsel
through independent means. But more than mere relevancy to the
issue of the documents sought is necessary; the movant must show
good cause . . . .94
After comment on the nature of good cause and of work product, the Court
concluded by stating:
We interpret good cause as used in our Rule 4:9 to mean that before
any party is entitled to the production of documents or other tangible

u.s. 983 (1970).

91 398
92 Though

the courts have divided over the issue, persuasive authority exists for the
extension of the immunity to the work product of nonlawyers. See, e.g., Alltmont
v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
98 398 u.s. 997-98 (1970).
94 210 Va. at 545-46, 172 S.E.2d at 755.
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.. ", ..~hings, such as are· inyqlv_e9d.n _this <;;as~. tP,~re nmst be a- showjng of
' some special circumstances in addition to relevancy. Di.scovery procedures were not intended to open an attorney's files to opposing
coul}Sel;.nor wer~ they intended to afford an attorney the luxury of
. , having opposing counsel investigate hi~ case fQr him.9 5

.

'

, In the~ ~-~~ent pn good cause? the Justices inade. clear that th~ ~~~uire
_mel,lt is not ~et by the "mere asser~on by affi~avit that discoyery i,s necessary Jar a movant to invest_ig:1te fully and prep~e his case." 9 u N.~i~h~r .is it
sat;isfied "wh,en the moving party has not sho~ a bona fide e~~rt. to- obtain
.the information by independent investigation," nor by "the :mery suspicion
.of counsel that. [a witness] R.ad ~ade inc~nsistent and incomplete .sta~yments
97
.: .• •.• "
These rulings 011.~~-nature of good cam;~?apparently apply-.~9:the
discovery of all tangible items, whether work product or nqt:~, So fru;:,p.~ _tpe
latter is concerned, the Co~ s~ted:
·. ::•: ·
i ) r•·

,. · \ '

· •

•

•.

·

·

•• ~-· ·• • •

7• 1 •

'.;:: ·. '. \vi~~ the sc~pe of q,.e ·good cause rl;lle .is the "war~ produ,ct'~:s}oc
... · . triQe1 whichl?rotec~s an att:c;>rney- from ?Pening his files for ~pec~on
... , . _by an oppost!lg attq:r;n,ey. This doctrme, however, do.es ..h()t offer
. --_; absolute ~ljnity, ah~ discovery. will'be ~ermitted whe~~ \-~~~;~i!l~
· '' ,. : of nec;:esSity ·greater thaq the normal requrrement for _g?od"'ca'Us.e. lS
·: ~'·· made.... Alltmont v.: United States, 177- F.2d 971 (3d Cir;'l950);"has
, extended the work product 'doctrine to perso~' obtaifllng stat~fu'ents
of witnesses for u5e ·of' trial counsel. . . . Where both' partjes·:have
an .equal opportUnity to investigate~ and where all the witnesses to the
. accident are known ~nd available to bo_th sides, discovery should' not
·_, >.be granted.-lls
. . ...- ..;·,
. :~ ..
. . '" .
.
1

... . . '

The threshold uncertainty in Rakes is what distinction the Court of
. Appeals i~tends to draw between-·~ork product; a~a .those- t:;angible things
'not prepared. for 'litigatio~. Tlie opinion -noted that- disc:Ove.ry: of. work
product ieqriires "a shoWirig~ Of ·necessitf gi'eater•than the-normal r~quire
ment for good cause," and referred to "documents or other tangible things,
such as are involved in this case." 99 But the rest of the opinion appears to
;deg,!,with g<;>~g.cause criteri~. a~ th~Y. relat~. to alldocumen~._a_nd tangible
things, not simply to work product. Perhaps the import of -t:he: helcl!qg -is
that plaintiff Rakes lacked good cause for discovery even had she sought
:n.on-work product documertts.
·
:. 'A· second issue lett"unclear:Ei~t~~-~o~t-~~~hy doc:~ents and things not
... -.9Ud..at54,7,172S.E.2dat756. , ., · ·- .
·.-<
:·;,).~itt at 5,46,l72·S.E.2d at 755 .. '-"; : . :.. ::. --' .. ·-.
. ,, .
" "'97]a.'at"s%. .548, 112 s.E.2d-at 75·s.i56.::..
· · .. -·, · · · .·
98/d. at 546~7, 172 S.E.Zd ati55-56 (p~agraphiilg ~ritted) •. '. ·-; · .. ·_- ·: ·-:_'. ·. ··· : ·
99/d. (emphasis added).
.":?.~ :.: ;';·:.'," ·:· _•
· -::: .•• ·.,' ~·;: .·
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prepared· for litigation should be given special protection from discovery, as
Rakes would seem to require. This protection might be given in Virginia
either because the Court believes that the language of Rule 4:9 precludes
the elimination of a good cause requirement for non-work product things,
or because as a matter of policy the JusticeS think that tangible material
not prepared for litigation should have a qualified immunity. But if the
former, and if the Court relies on the ''plain meaning" of the rule's provisions, where in those provisions is there a "plain" indication that work
product is entided to "a showing of necessity greater than the normal requirement for good cause?"
Third, the factors which the Virginia Court wishes taken into account
in determining good cause remain somewhat uncertain. The Justices upheld
denial of production in Rakes because
the plaintiff offered no evidence to dispute the statements in the affidavit filed by defendants' counsel that defendants, their agents, or
agents of their insurer did not interview or obtain statements from
witnesses "immediately upon the occurrence of the accident or as
soon thereafter," and that no investigation was begun on behalf of
defendants until after the present action was instituted.
Thus plaintiff's counsel had the opportunity to make an investigation and to interview the witnesses before defendants, their agents, or
the agents of their insurer. The names and addresses of witnesses were
available to counsel from the trooper who investigated the accident.
Plaintiff also obtained the names and addresses of all witnesses known
to defendants through interrogatories. The fact that plaintiff's counsel
was employed only a short time before the action was brought and
that plaintiff was unable to assist counsel in any way, because she was
incapacitated, does not change the situation here.too
It appears that the Court was most concerned with Rakes' equal "opportunity to investigate" and with the continued availability of witnesses. These
facto.t:s are, of course, important. But how substantial a showing of need
for the documents ·sought must the would-be discoverer make? What if,
though a party had an equal or even better opportunity to investigate than
his adversary, he failed to do so and now.has substantial need for the docu.,.
ments? What if, though witnesses are still available, a would-be discoverer
can no longer obtain from them the substantial equivalent of the writte~
statements possessed by his adversary? More fundamentally, is the Virginia
Court primarily concerned with denying "an. attorney the luxury of having
opposing counsel investigate his case for Jllm" or with giving each party
access to that material necessary- to eliminate surprise and facilitate reliable
~a~~-finding?
., _
·
100 /d. at 547,

172 S.E.2d at 756.

1522

V ir.ginia Law Review

[Vol. 56:1500

. Li,mited tO its facts, Rakes seeins correctly 'decided. First, the documents
sought were clearly work product. Second, the plaintiff apparently made
no showing .of substantial need for them. The witnesses were known to
her and remained readily available for examination. Finally, the plaintiff
does not appear to have presented convincing evidence that she would have
been· unable to obtain testimony from the witnesses substantially equivalent
to that already held by defendants.
To the extent that Rakes goes beyond the facts presented, however, and
indicates that non.:work product things are entitled to special protection,
the decision does not appear wise. For reasons already stated,1°1 there seems
insufficient reason to provide such protection. Should the Court .feel that
the present wording of Rule 4:9 prevents the elimination of a good cause
requirement for non-work product material, it would be well for.it to consi~er ame~dments similar to those recently made in the federal rules.
Trial

Trial errors .made by counsel were fatal to numerous appeals during the
past year. The·Court pointed to the terminal nature of (1) failing to raise
first in the trial court an issue later directed to the appellate court,102 (2) failing' to raise timely or adequately precise objection in the trial court to judicial
rulings later appealed,103 and (3) failing to request first from the trial judge
any. affirmative step later urged on appeal. 104 As the Justices made clear in
Reil v. Commonwealth/ 05 the fact that a contention has merit will not
overcome its faulty presentation below. During Reil's embezzlement trial,
· 101 See

text at pages 1517-18 supra.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Indem. Co., 210 Va. 769, 773, 173 S.E.2d 855,
858 (1970); Thrasher v. Thrasher, 210 Va. 624, 628-29, 172 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1970); cf.
Edwards v. Jackson, 210 Va. 450, 171 S.E.2d 854 (1970). In Edwards the Court held
that judgment for a plaintiff under the survival statute moots any claim to join the
survival action with one under the death by wrongful act statute, when the plaintiff
has not claimed a ·right to recover under both.
103 Haymo!e v. Brizendine, 210 Va. 578, 580-81, 172 S.E.2d 774, 776-77 (1970) (failure
to object to· condition of new trial imposed on leave to amend pleading); R;tkes v.
Fttlcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1970) (failure to object to form jury
verdict before jury discharged); Reil v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 369, 372, 171 S.E.2d
162,- 1<l4-6S (1969) . (failure to object to introduction of letter as privileged cOJI1muni~tion); Tid~water Constr. Corp. v. Duke, 210 Va. 143, 147-48, 169 S.E.2d 585, 588-89
p969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 938 (1970) (failure to object to introduction· of deposition
on proper grounds,and failure to object to jury inst;ruction when given) •.
>104 Haymore v. Brizendine, 210 Va. 578, Sill, 172 S.E.2d 774, 777 (1970) ("[C]ounsel
did not offer an instrriction that recovery • • • could be predicated on • • • simple
negligence. The court committed no error in failing to do what courisel had not
asked it to do.")
105 210 Va. 369, 171 S.E.2d 162 (1969), noted in Schwartz, Evidence, 1969-1910 Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1326-27, 1334-35 (1970).
··
102 Utica
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his counsel made .a general objection to the introduction of a letter to the
defendant from his wife. "This letter," said the Court, "if proper objection
had been made and exception noted, was inadmissible as a privileged communication . . . . Defendant's counsel did not object, however, on the
ground, that the letter was a privileged communication. Rather, he made a
general objection, which the trial judge interpreted as an objection that the
~etter was irrelevant . . . . Thus, proper objection was no.t made in compliance with Rule 1: 8 . . . ." lOG This Rule provides:
· In civil and criminal cases, all objections to writs of every kind,
pleadings, instructions, notices, the admissibility of evidence, or other
matters requiring a ruling or judgment of the trial court, shall state
with reasonable certainty the ground of objection, and unless it appears
from the record to have been so stated, such objections will not be
considered by this Court except for good cause shown, or to enable
this Court to attain the ends of justice.
The Court then noted, as it has in the past, that this rule is designed to avoid
the delay and expense of appeals and reversals for errors that might have
been avoided or corrected by a properly informed trial judge. It seems
clear ·that counsel who wish to ensure an appellate decision on the merits
must take care to leave no procedural stone unturned below.
Similarly, within the bounds of honesty, counsel would do well to see
that their clients do not give decisive force to adverse testimony by the
nature of their own testimony, or by a failure adequately to rebut hostile
evidence. In Crawford v. Quartemzan,l07 the Court of Appeals reversed a
judgment for plaintiff on the ground that "[p]laintiff cannot expect the
court to disregard his testimony. His case can be no stronger nor rise any
higher than his own testimony permits." On reviewing the evidence, the
Court found that plaintiff's testimony supported that of one of the defendants and ruled out negligence .on his part. By the same token, the
uncontradicted testimony of an adverse witness can also result in a party's
downfall. In Beale v. ]ones, 108 the defendant had been found negligent, and
the trial court had entered judgment for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
disposed of the case by finding that "[t]he testimony of [the adverse wit~
ness] is clear, reasonable and uncontradicted that [defendant's] presence and
conduct did not 'detract' his attention from the road ahead and that he kept
his 'eyes on the road because [he] had to see what was in front of [him]!
lOG

210 Va. at 372, 171 S.E.2d at 164.

noted in Torts, 1969-1970 Annual
SUT'Vey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1424-25 (1970).
··
107 210 Va. 598, 603, 172 S.E.2d 739, 742 (1970),

10s 210 Va. 519, 171 S.E.2d 851 (1970).
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The record· shows that [the witness] underwent a rigorous examination: as
an adverse witness." 1oo
In Fisher v. Gordon,U 0 the Court recited the hoary rules governing the
inferences to be drawn on a motion· to strike and the rules determining
which questions of negligence are to be left to the jury and which are to
be decided by the judge as a matter of law. In a 4 to 3 decision, the
Justices then reversed·a summary judgment for the defendant entered below
on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter- Qf
law. 111 Fisher was the only practice and pleading case of this Survey period
that divided the Court. The dissenters "disagree[d] with the majority opinion that the appellant was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. She made: a left turn under hazardous .~eather conditions direcrly
11cross the path of appellee's car which·was overtaking and pas~ng her. A
glance to lier left, however fleeting, immediately before beginriing hef' turn
would have revealed the other vehicle." 112 The factual emph~s of the
dissent is indicative of the thrust of many of the Court's procedural deci~ions: Often the legal principles at stake are well established, and controversy centers only upon whether they have been properly applied to the
facts. As a rule, such cases could safely be left to an intermediate appellate
court, and their frequent appearance on the docket of the Supreme Court
of Appeals provides notable incentive for the creation of such an interme~iate appellate body in Virginia.113
In Rakes v. Fulcher, 114 the Court held that it is not improper for a judge
to give the jury form verdicts, one of which they may choose upon reaching a decision. The Justices also concluded that it is not error for a .trial
judge to enter judgment for both a master and his servant, in an action
where the former's liability is predicated upon that of the latter, even when
the name of the master is not mentioned in the verdict returned by the
109 I d.

at 522, 171 S.E.2d at 853.
.
Va. 523, 526, '171 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1970), noted in Torts, 1969-1970 Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1420-21 (1970).
111 Cf. Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 169 S.E.2d 563 (19,69).
Plaintiff in Whitfield claimed error in the deletion of the word "possess" from a, trial
court instruction that "lilt was the duty of the defendant ••• to possess and exercise
such reasonable ~d ordinary skill ••• as are ordinarily exercised by the average of the
members of her profession ••••" Jd. at 180, 169 S.E.2d at 566. Plaintiff argued that
the deletion of "possess" took from the jury the question whether or not the defendant
possessed the requisite skill. The Court upheld the deletion on the ground that "all the
evidence showed that [the defendant) did possesS th~ p.JOoper training and requisite
skill •••." Jd. at 181, 169 S.E.2d at 566-67.
112 210 Va. at 528, 171 S.E.2d at 839.
113See generally Lilly & Scalia, Appel!ate~]ttstice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1971).
114 210 Va. 542, 172 S.E.2d 751 (1970).
110 210
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jury. The Court stated that. under these circumstances "a verdict in favor
of the servant requires a verdict for the master also." 115
Appeal
Rule ):1
Holland v. Bliss.116-The Court of Appeals in Holland reaffirmed the necessity that a party hew to the letter of the explicit time limits for perfecting
an appeal. The case was resolved on a motion to dismiss the appeal for
appellant's failure to designate the parts of the record to be printed in time
for the record to be retained by the trial court clerk for twenty' days. Prior
to its recent amendment, 117 Rule 5:1, section 6(a) stated that:"[n]ot less
than twenty days before the record is transmitted, counsel {or appellaqt
shall file with the clerk [of the trial court] a designation of the parts of the
record that he wishes printed:" Old section 7 of the iule provided that the
record then had to remain in the clerk's office for at, least twenty days;
unless transmission was requested sooner by all counsel. Rule 5:4, in turn,
states that the record is to be filed with the Supreme Court of Appeals clerk
"within the time allowed by statute for presenting a petition for appeal"--:::
four months from the date of the final order, under Virginia Code section
8-463. Although the final order in Holland was handed down on March 27,
1968, appellant did not designate parts of the record until July 11, 1968.
To enable him to present his petition to the Court before the expiration
of the time for appeal, the clerk released the record to appellant's counsel
on July 24th, and he delivered it that day to a Justice. "Thus," said the
Court, "the record remained in the clerk's office only thirteen' days before
being released to counsel for the plaintiff, rather than the twenty days
required by Rule 5:1, § 7. Counsel for the defendant did not consent to
early transmittal of the record. The clerk was without authority to release
the record as he did on July 24, 1968, and it was not, therefore, properly
filed with this court. . . . The cited rules are mandatory and jurisdictional
.•.. Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules requires dismissal of
his appeal." 118
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, lnc. 119-While Holland fits -readily into
Virginia precedent affirming the sanctity of the precise temporal require115 !d. at 549, 172 S.E.2d at 757; cf. Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714, 718 (D.C. Cir.
1969), discussed at notes 30-33 supra.
116 210 Va. 460, 171 S.E.2d 687 (1970).
117 See text at note 135 infra.
,
118 210 Va. at 461, 171 S.E.2d at 688. See also Buchner v. Kenyon L. Edwards .Co.,
210 Va. 502,505, 171 S.E.2d 676,678 (1970).
119 208 Va. cxiii (1967), vacated & remanded, 392 U.S. 657, reordered, 209 Va. 279,
163 S.E.2d 588 (1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
·
·
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ments for appeal, 120 Sullivan cannot be so easily reconciled with prior decisions of the Court. The Sullivan cases involved the more abstract requirements of Rule 5:1, section 3(f), which, as pertinent here, provides (1) that
" [ c] ounsel tendering the transcript .•. shall give opposing counsel reasonable written notice of the time and place of tendering it;" (2) that he ?hall
also provide "a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true
copy of it;" and (3) that "[t]he signature of the judge, without more, will
be deemed tO: be his certification that counsel had the required notice and
opportunity, and that the transcript ... is authentic."
The Sullivan cases involved alleged discrimination against a black family
in the use of community recreational facilities. After their complaints were
dismissed in the trial court, plaintiffs began preparation of the record for
appeal. On June 9, 1967, plaintiffs' counsel notified defendants' counsel by
telephone that he would submit the transcript to the trial judge that day.
He wrote defendants' attorney to the same effect, indicating also that he
was filing motions to correct and that he would request the judge to allow
a ten-day period in which opposing counsel might inspect and consent or
object to the transcript. The letter was received on the following Monday,
June 12th. Since the judge had been absent from his chambers when the
transcript was delivered on June 9, he ruled that he received it on June 12th.
When the motions to correct were heard on June 16th, the court dedined
to act until defendants' counsel had a further opportunity to examine the
transcript, and he was personally given a copy to inspect. Three days later,
on June 19th, he informed plaintiffs' counsel that he had no objections to
the transcript as corrected and signed the proposed orders which plaintiffs'
attorney had prepared. The orders were then submitted to the judge who
signed the transcript on June 20, without objection by the defendants.
The Virginia Court refused to review the Sullivan cases on the ground that
" 'the appeal was not perfected in the manner provided by law in that
opposing counsel was not given reasonable written notice of the time and
place of tendering the transcript and a reasonable opportunity to examine
the original or a true copy of it,'" under Rule 5:1, section 3(f).121 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Virginia judgments and remanded the cases for reconsideration in light of ]ones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co./22 decided the same day.l23
On remand, the Virginia Court was adamant:
Our orders of December 4, 1967, refusing the appeals in these cases,
were adjudications that this court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
120E.g., Crum v. Udy, 206 Va. 880, 146 S.E.2d 878 (1966); Mears v. Mears, 206

V.a. 444, 143 S.E.2d 889

(1965).
121209 Va. at 280, 163 S.E.2d at 589. See 208 Va. cxili (1967).
'122 392 u.s. 409 (1968).
123 392 U.S.657 (1968).
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appeals because of the failure of counsel for the Sullivans and the
Freemans to meet the requirements of Rule 5:1, § 3(f). Only this
court may say when it does and when it does not have jurisdiction
under its Rules. We had no jurisdiction in the cases when they were
here before, and we have no jurisdiction now. We adhere to our
orders refusing the appeals in these cases. 124
To support its procedural ruling, the Court cited ouly Snead v. Common'Jl)ealth/25 ignoring countervailing precedent. And of Snead, the Court said
simply: "In Sne{Cd ... we held the terms of Rule 5:1, § 3(f) to be mandatory and jurisdictional, and for the failure of counsel for Snead to meet the
requirements of the Rule, the writ of error ... was dismissed." 126
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari. No Justice found that the
Virginia Court's application of section 3(f) precluded federal review of the
Sullivan merits, although failure by a party to abide by state procedural
requirements constitutes an adequate state ground of decision, which almost
invariably precludes such federal review. The Court, it appears, was not
persuaded that the Sullivan parties had actually violated the section as it
migllt reasonably have been understood when they tendered the transcript.
In terms of its own prior section 3(f) decisions, the Virginia Court's
action in Sullivan was not reasonably foreseeable. Past decisions have been
concerned with whether opposing counsel had a reasonable opportunity to
examine the transcript after he received notice of its tender to the judge
and before its signature by the judge. These decisions have put no stress
on written, as opposed to actual, no~ce; nor have they indicated that the
provision of written notice in advance of the act of tendering is quintessential. As the Court stated in Bacigalupo v. Fleming:
The requirement that opposing counsel have a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript sets out the purpose of reasonable
notice. If, after receipt of notice, opposing counsel be afforded reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript, and to make objections
thereto, if any he has, before it is signed by the trial judge, the object
of reasonable notice will have been attained. 127
The Court of Appeals had also made clear in Bolin v. Laderbergl2B that
the signature of the trial judge, unaccompanied by objections from a party,
124 209 Va. at 281, 163 S.E.2d at 589.
12:>200 Va. 850, 108 S.E.2d 399, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 868 (1959).
126 209 Va. at 280-81, 163 S.E.2d at 589.
127199 Va. 827, 835, 102 S.E.2d 321, 326 (1958). See also Cook v. Virginia Holsum
Bakeries, Inc., 207 Va. 815, 153 S.E.2d 209 (1967); Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153
S.E.2d 251 (1967); Taylor v. Wood, 201 Va. 615, 112 S.E.2d 907 (1960); Stokely v.
Owens, 189 Va. 248, 52 S.E.2d 164 (1949); Grimes v. Crouch, 175 Va. 126, 7 S.E.2d
115 (1940); Boyd, supra note 24, at 1811.
128207 Va. 795,153 S.E.2d 251 (1967).
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virtually concludes the issue, pursuant to the mandate of Ruk S:J; section
3(f):
The motion to dismiss may be overruled surninarily by referring to
Rule 5: 1 § 3 (f) itself. It is true that the rule requires that counsel
tendering a transcript "shall give opposing counsel reasonable written
notice .of the time and J?lace of tendering it and a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true copy of it." But another portion of the rule provides that "the signature of the judge, '\vithou~
more, will be deemed to be his certification that counsel had the
required notice and opportunity, and that the transcript . ; . is authentic."
Here, the. trial judge noted on the transcript the date it was tendered
to him and the date he signed it. His signature appears on. the. tran:..
script '1!Jithout more and is, ther~fore, his certification that cou.nsel for
the lesse~ had the required notice . of tendering the tr;tnscript and
• .
. .
the required opportunity to e?'arnine it. 12 9
Moreover, in Cook v. Virginia Ho?ium Bakeries, Inc., the Justices found
significant the fact that the party raising the section 3 (f) claim. ~'<;:oncl!c,led
in oral arg~ent before us that the statement signed by the trial jl:J.dge .was
correct." 130 In Cook the opposing counsel had been notified on Qctober 1,5
that tender woul~ take place on October 20; he received a copy ,of the
transcript on Octc:>ber 19; it was signed by the judge two d;tys. later,. C)q.
the 21st.
·
·
·
' ' · ·
Opposing counsel in Sullivan receive~ actual notice of the. te~deri~g of
~he tra~cript on June 9, and written notice on June 12. The tr~p..scri~t ..l~Y;
m the JUdge's chambers from June 9 to· June 19, and was available there
to opposing counsel at least from the 12th. He had a copy of it m his possession for three. days, from the 16th to the 19th, and he affirinativel)" made
known his satisfaction with it. He presented no objections to its signature by
the judge on June 20. During· oral argument before. the' ·Sup;t:eme .Court,
defendants could not poiq.t to a single inaccuracy in the transcript. 131 In
short, opposing counsel in Sullivan had a reasonable opportunity....:and .all
the opportunity that he desired-to examine the transcript after he was liOtified of its tender and before its signature by the judge.
. · :1
Reliance on Snead did not avail the Virginia Court. That. case involved
outrageous facts: A narrative ,rather than a trans.cript wa.S tendered; appellant's own counsel admitted that it was "confusing;"· tender occurred
after working hours and with a view to immediate signature; and opposing
counsel was giv;e~ orny one· half hour's notice. The Court empha:'ized. th~
at 797, 153 S.E.2d at 253; accord, Boyd, supra note 24, at 1811-12.
Va. 815,817, 153 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1967).
131 396 U.S. at 246-47 n.l3 (Harlan, ]., d~enting).
· ·
129 Id.

130 207
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facts heavily in determining that reasonable notice had ,not been given
"within the plain meaning of Rule 5:1, § 3(f)," the terms of which are
«mandatory and jurisdictional." 132 But the facts of Sullivan ·are wholly
unlike those of Snead, and, absent any explanation by the Court, it is difficult to see how Snead in any way precluded a finding that the Sullivan
plaintiffs had complied with section 3(f). Justice Harlan seems clearly correct in his conclusion that "[t]he finding of the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals of a violation of Rule 5:1, § 3(f), in this case was ... based on a
standard of reasonableness much stricter than that which could have been
fairly extracted from the earlier Virginia cases applying the rule ...." 133
This is not to say that section 3(f) is not "mandatory and jurisdictional"
as the Virginia Court has insisted. Justice Douglas, writing f?r the majority
in Sullivan, erred in terming the rule "dicretionary," but perhaps his terminology was occasioned by a desire to be gracious. For if the rule is jurisdictional, then the Virginia Court's refusal to hear the Sullivan appeals
constituted a sudden shift in judicial interpretation of the demands of the
rule. Such judicial law-making was certainly within the power of the Court,
and it could certainly conclude the litigation so far as Virginia rights were
concerned. But the Court's .decision could not deny federal review of a
state decision affecting federal rights. Failure by a party to follow a state
procedural rule provides an adequate state ground of decision, foreclosing
federal review, only when the party might reasonably have been aware of
the rule's demands.134
The Virginia Court's decision in Sullivan was unfortunate on a number
132 It is important that time be given opposing counsel for a reasonable opportunity
to analyze such statements characterized by defendant's counsel as being confusing. :The entire testimony of a very material witness was left out of the narrative statement when it was presented to the trial judge and it was necessary for
him to insert it. We are of the opinion that the notice delivered to the Commonwealth's Attorney at his residence, after office hours, thirty minutes before
tendering a narrative statement of the evidence to the trial judge for his signature,
·does not constitute reasonable notice within the plain meaning of Ru1e 5:1, § 3(f)
and that the terms of this Rule are mandatory and jurisdictional.
200 Va. at 854, 108 S.E.2d at 402.
133 396 U.S. at 245.
13~'fhe Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 456 {1958), stated that
"[w]e are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court
m the present case with its past unambiguous holdings as to the scope of review available upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt judgment." The Court went
on to say that, even if the Alabama ruling had some basis in precedent, "such a local
procedural rule, although it may now appear in retrospect to form part of a consistent, pa,ttern, of procedures to obtain appellate review, cannot avail the State here,
because petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been appriSed of its existence.
Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this
Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights." Id. at 457-58.
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of scores. First, it confused and rigidified a s~ep. ·of the appel!ate· process,
the decision amounted to little more th~n a judicial. ipse dixit.iti
particularly inappropriate circumstances: Sudden chang~.in·th_e interpre.:.
tation of a rule, especially changes costly to persons who .llitve reasonably
relied on past interprcitation, shoUld be carefully. explained and justified in
the opinion announcing the new reading.. F.1nally, the ~ullivan cases pro-;vided the Virginia Justices a_n opportunity ~o ,deal .with a matter of great
complexity and contemporary moment. Had they treated the. merits in ·a
well-reasoned opinion, they could have ·contributed significantly to the shap•
ing of the national corpus juris. It. is regrettable that the Court· felt- itself
jurisdictionally precluded from dealing with the substan~e of: Sullivan. · .
S~~onQ.,

Amendment of Rule 5:1
On September 1, 1970, a significant am.ertdme-nt of Virginj:a Supreme
Court of Appeals Rule 5:1,135 section 6(a) t_ook effect, ·changing the
for designation of the parts of the record to be' printed. Priot to i.ts amend-:ment, section 6(a) called for designation "[n:] ot less than twenty days before
the record is transmitted." Designation now ta~es·'place "[n]ot more thari
fourteen days after the date of the certificate of the de,rk of this Court .. -.
that an appeal has been awarded." This temporal· shift provides welcome
relief to appellate counsel by limiting the time-;~ons~ming process of desig:
nation to those cases in which appeal is actually· granted. Unde,r amende,d
section 6(a), counsel for the appellee has fourteen days from _the filing of
the appellant's designation to note "the additional· parts of the record that
he wishes printed as germane to the assignmen~ of error and of any eros~
error made." Counsel for appellant, in turn,, has fourteen days from- i:he
appellee's designation to indicate "any additional [germane] p~ts of the
record that he may wish printed." The amended requirements of section
6 (a) have been incorporated into section 6 (b) as· well, and thus apply to
criminal as well as civil proceedings. Section 6 has been· fmther altered by
an amendment of section 6(c), which presents in greater detail and somewhat different format the proper form of designation.
·
·.
Rule 5:1, section 7, governing transmission of the record, was necfSsarlly
amended in the wake of the section 6 changes.. Section 7 p.revio11sly provided for the retention of the record, in the office of the ·trial .court clerk
for twenty days after the appellant's designation· of tlie parts to: be printed.
Under the section as amended,

time

[ t] he clerk shall retain the record for twe'n.ty-one days ~fter the notice
of appeal and assignments of error have been filed with the clerk , . .
or, if a~ the time of such filing counsel for the appellant also files with
135-See 211 Va.l13 (1970).
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the clerk notice that a transcript or statement will thereafter be filed
... , the clerk shall retain the record for twenty-one days after. the
filing of such transcript or statement . . . .
Thus, as a rule, transmission of the record now occurs before, rather than
after, designation of the parts to be printed. The amended Rule adds a
statement that "[t]he clerk's failure to transmit the record as herein provided
shall not be ground for dismissal of the appeal by this Court." In addition,
the section eliminates the possibility, present under the old rule, of transmittal "to the clerk of this Court at ... Staunton." Transmittal must now
take place in Richmond alone; the same geographic restriction has been imposed in amended Rule 5:4, governing the place for filing petitions and
records.
Rule 5: 1's section 8, like its section 7, has been modified to take account
of the change in section 6. Under old section 8, the clerk simply caused the
record to be printed after an appeal was allowed; now he does so "[a]fter
an appeal has been allowed and all designations for printing have been made,
or the time allowed therefor has expired, or counsel have indicated earlier
in writing that no further designations will be made."
Standard of Review
In Bailey v. Pioneer Federal Savings & Loan Association, the Court of
Appeals reiterated that " [t] he report of a commissioner in chancery . . .
is entided to great weight and should not be disturbed unless its conclusions are unsupported by the evidence. The decree of a trial court confirming the report is presumed to be correct and will not be reversed unless
plainly wrong." 136 In Bryant v. Commonwealth Custom Builders, Inc., the
Court affirmed the holding of the trial court, stating:
The issues which are dispositive of the case are factual.
The case was tried without a jury. The evidence was not transcribed. From the narrative statement of the testimony and incidents
of trial prepared by the trial judge, the exhibits and extracts from the
depositions of two witnesses, we cannot say that the judgment of the
lower court is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 137
And in Beale v. ]ones, the Court noted the effect of a jury verdict on appellate review, indicating that "the evidence and all proper inferences from the
evidence will be stated in the light most favorable to the appellee since she
was awarded the jury's verdict." 138
13G 210 Va. 558, 562, 172 S.E.2d 730, 734 (1970); accord, Graves, Practice and Ple,lding,
1968-1969 Annual Survey of Virgi11ia Law, 55 VA. L. REv. 1207, 1216 n59 (1969).
137 210 Va. 296, 171 S.E.2d 268,269 (1969).
138 210 Va. 519, 520, 171 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1970).
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Procedural Federalism
The Virginia Court of Appeals had occasion during the Survey period to
reiterate its supremacy over Virginia law. Commenting on a Fourth Circuit decision construing Virginia insurance law139 that had been nullified
by a subsequent Virginia holding,140 the Court stated of the federal ruling
that it "was not binding precedent but was only persuasive authority. It
represented the opinion of the . . . Fourth Circuit on the validity of the
'other insurance' provision in a Virginia insurance policy that had been issued
pursuant to statute. Until such time as this court spoke, the validity of the
'other insurance' provision was not a matter susceptible of exact knowledge
or interpretation and could only be the subject of an opinion." 141
Federal courts deferred to Virginia law on numerous occasions during
the past year-for example, by upholding Virginia process and ordering full
faith and credit to a Virginia judgment,142 by refusing to give a federal
forum to a party who had previously acceded to Virginia jurisdiction by
filing counterclaims in state court,143 and by denying impleader in federal
court where there was no substantive right under Virginia law to the relief
sought. 144 On the other hand, when a Virginia decision affected substantive
federal rights, the Supreme Court in Sullivan refused to have its jurisdiction
ousted by a Virginia procedural ruling that it found to be without adequate
basis.
Federalism confronts an unusually delicate situation when a United States
district court is requested to enjoin the operation of a state law allegedly
incompatible with the Federal Constitution. There is potential not only for
the disruption of state programs and activities in such requests, but also
for a sharp blow to state hubris. Disruption and insult may in turn breed
resistance. Accordingly, it is important that federal courts take steps to
lessen the chance of error in the granting of such injunctions,l45 and, further, that action be taken by a trial court of unusual dignity, with expedited
appeal. To these ends, Congress established the three-judge district court,
with direct appeal of its decisions to the Supreme Court. 146 While the threejudge procedure serves the interests of federal-state comity, it also carries
139Travclers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963).
140Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
141 Piedmont Trust Bank v. Aema Cas. & Sur. Co., 210 Va. 396, 400, 171 S.E.2d 264,
267 (1969) (paragraphing omitted).
142 Luther Compton & Sons, Inc. v. Community Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 93
(N.D. Okla.1969).
143 Sood v. Advanced Computer Techniques Corp., 308 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Va. 1969).
144 Brooks v. Brown, 307 F. Supp. 907 (E.D. Va. 1969).
·
145 "The crux of the business is procedural protection against an improvident state-wide
doom by a federal court of a state's legislative policy." Phillips v. United States, 312
u.s. 246,251 (1941).
146 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-84 (Supp. I, 1966). See also id. § 1253 (Supp. H, 1967).
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with it the severe disadvantage of heightening the burdens of an already
overburdened federal judiciary. These burdens-the need to assemble three
federal judges to sit as one trial court and the automatic, direct appeal to
the Supreme Court-are particularly vexing when the case involves relatively
unimportant issues. Thus, federal courts have severely limited the availability of a three-judge court, reading the pertinent statute "not as a measure
of broad social policy to be construed with great liberality, but as an enactment technical in the strict sense of the term and to be applied as such." 147
A federal district court in Virginia recently was requested to convene a
three-judge court to hear a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief
against both Virginia Senate Joint Resolution No. 12, entitled "Unionization
of officers and employees of the Commonwealth," and certain rules and
regulations of the Newport News police and fire departments restricting the
political activity and unionization of their members.148 The Senate resolution, adopted in 1946 with the concurrence of the House, provides that
"[i] t is contrary to the public policy of Virginia for any State, county, or
municipal officer or agent to be vested with or possess any authority to
recognize any union as a representative of any such public officers or employees, or to negotiate with any such union or its agents with respect to
any matter relating to them or their employment or service . . . ." 149 The
plaintiffs challenged the resolution and the Newport News provisions on
first and fourteenth amendment grounds, suing the city, certain city officials
and the local Commonwealth's Attorney. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to convene a three-judge court, while granting the motion of the
Commonwealth's Attorney that the action be dismissed as to Virginia, on the
grounds that the Newport News regulations were purely local in effect and
that the Senate resolution "expresses only the opinion of that legislative
body," since it was not adopted in the form of a statute. Thus, there was "no
state statute of general and statewide application in issue," 150 and no basis
for a three-judge court or for suit against the Commonwealth.
Though the Newport News regulations are clearly of only local effect, a
decision for the plaintiffs in this action will have. impact on other such regulations throughout the Commonwealth. Moreover, though the Senate resolution was not adopted in statute form, a state policy is certainly at issue.
Nonetheless, much can be said for the district court's decision. Precedent
147 Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251 (1941); accord, Goldstein v. Cox, 396
U.S. 471, 476 (1970); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124 (1965). See generally
Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constittttional Litigation, 32 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1, 29-55 (1964).
148 Newport News Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Newport News, 307 F. Supp. 1113
-(E.D. Va. 1969).
149 Va. Senate J.R. No. 12 (1946).
150 307 F. Supp. at 1115.
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suggests that no technicality is too slight to be seized upon as a means to
avoid a three-judge court.15l Here, iwo routes of escape presented themselves. The Newport News regulations are unescapably local, and among
the classic three-judge court technicalities is the rule that, even where a
decision against a state policy would affect the state as a whole, if the issue
arose with direct impact only on a locality, the three-judge court procedure
is unavailable. 152 And, of course, it could be argued in any event that no
statewide statute is at stake. As a matter of policy, the wisdom of the
~ourt's refusal to convene a three-judge court was manifest in the Commonwealth's lack of interest in the case. The only compelling reason for
the existence of the three-judge procedure is to minister to states aroused
over the prospect that a federal court may enjoin practices highly valued
by them. Virginia was obviously not so aroused here. Thus, federal-state
comity did not call for an extraordinary trial court and an extraordinary
appellate process.
A Concluding Note on Craftsmanship

Court should be encouraged to say no more than necesary, if for no other
reason than to contain our burgeoning case reports. But the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals could safely have said more about several of its
more difficult procedural decisions of the past year. There is, of course,
some merit in a selective use of precedent that largely ignores decisions
opposed to the announced result, just as there is some merit in limiting
discussion of the policy considerations that shaped the result. An opinion
that simply delivers the law, unexplained, may facilitate decision-making,
since the court need not come to grips with the precise reasons for its decision; absent the need to articulate rationale, there is less necessity and impetus to confront and deal with countervailing precedent and policy-or, for
that matter, with material that supports the desired result. An unexplained
opinion also helps to ward off criticism, for if the court veils its distinguishing or overruling of contrary precedent and if it rarely reveals its policy
choices and the reasons for them, the opinion will not lend itself easily to
attack by those with different views about precedent or policy. Further,
the failure to articulate rationale may promote unanimity on a collegial
court,_ as often the brethren can agree on result though not on the reasons
for it.
Against these advantages, however, are the notable disadvantages of unexplained exposition of the law. First, decision-making in which the decisionmaker is not encouraged to face and resolve all pertinent issues of precedent
and policy runs the risk of being at best unfocused, and at worst ill-advised.
151 See note 147 supra.
152E.g., Griffin v. County

School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1964).
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Second, results without rationale do less than necessary to explain what the
law is, and this, in tum, breeds uncertainty and unpredictability about things
legal. It has been well stated that "[e]ven when a court reaches results
whose wisdom is open to debate, good craftsmanship and technique can
·Contribute to predictability and 'certainty.' For if a court demonstrates
that it has considered all the precedents and fully weighed all the relevant
policy considerations before reaching its final result, even those who disagree
can evaluate the basis for the holding and recognize the extent to which the
judgment announced is maintainable and unlikely to yield to future attack.
Even more important, a careful student can then more accurately estimate
the probable future scope of the announced holding or rule and the probable future development of the doctrine in the area.'' 153 Finally, a simple
statement of a court's conclusion does little to satisfy the party who loses,
and who may have advanced strong precedent and policy arguments in his
favor. An important function of any court is to explain to the unsuccessful
party why he lost so that he and society as a whole can have confidence
that his legitimate claims have been heard and justice done.

153 P.

MisHKIN & C. MoRRis, ON LAw IN CoURTS 224 (1965).

